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Riki Matsumoto2
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
March 17, 2020; Revised Date: April 8, 2022
Abstract
The Global Financial Crisis that began in 2007 intensified the decade-long malaise of two of
the largest auto manufacturers in the US, General Motors and Chrysler. Their possible
collapse was deemed to pose a systemic risk by the United States government. In response,
the Department of the Treasury made efforts to provide support to the automotive industry
through the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP). As US auto parts suppliers
experienced deteriorated automotive markets, disrupted manufacturer operations, and
stressed credit markets, the Treasury announced the Auto Supplier Support Program (ASSP)
on March 19, 2009, as an auxiliary program to the overall AIFP. The ASSP was run through
the two auto manufacturers and only suppliers selected by those companies could
participate. Participating suppliers could use the program to access government financing
for any eligible outstanding manufacturers’ receivables. The ASSP established bankruptcyremote special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to purchase eligible receivables from participating
suppliers for a fee. The SPVs were funded through a cash contribution from GM and Chrysler
and a $5 billion total loan commitment from the Treasury, authorized under the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). The program outcomes were considered mixed
and its specific role in reducing the pressure on US auto parts suppliers is difficult to

1 This case

is one of eight Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) modules considering the various elements
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• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module B: Restructuring General Motors Through Bankruptcy”
by Kaleb B. Nygaard.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module C: Restructuring Chrysler Through Bankruptcy” by
Alexander Nye.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module D: Emergency Assistance to Ally Financial (formerly
GMAC)” by Riki Matsumoto and Kaleb B. Nygaard.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module E: Emergency Assistance for Chrysler Financial” by
Alexander Nye.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module F: Auto Supplier Support Program” by Riki Matsumoto.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module G: The Auto Warranty Commitment Program” by
Benjamin Henken.
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determine. The ASSP was terminated in April 2010, after all loans made under the program
were repaid. The Treasury collected $116.4 million in interest and value from the ASSP.
Keywords: Auto Supplier Support Program, Automotive Industry Financing Program,
Chrysler, EESA, General Motors, TARP
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Auto Supplier Support Program
At a Glance
The US Treasury announced the Auto
Supplier Support Program (ASSP) on March
19, 2009. Through the ASSP, auto
manufacturers could reassure key suppliers
that they would be paid for their products
(Treasury 2009b).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: The Auto Supplier Support Program was
intended to provide liquidity and improve access to
credit to auto suppliers by allowing them to sell
eligible receivables from manufacturers to the
SPVs.
Announcement
March 19, 2009
date
Operational date
April 9, 2009
Expiration date
April 5, 2010 (GM), April 7,
2010 (Chrysler)
Legal authority
Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008
Maximum amount
$5 billion, reduced to $3.5
authorized
billion ($2.5 billion for GM,
$1 billion for Chrysler)
Peak utilization
GM Supplier Receivables LLC
($290 million); Chrysler
Receivables SPV, LLC
($123.1 million)
Participants
Approx. 370 Tier 1 base
suppliers for GM & 60 for
Chrysler3
Administrators
US Department of Treasury,
Citibank (servicer)

The ASSP established bankruptcy-remote
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to purchase
eligible receivables from participating
suppliers for a fee (SIGTARP 2009a). The
SPVs were funded through a $5 billion total
loan commitment from the Treasury,
authorized under the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) (Treasury
2009b). General Motors (GM) and Chrysler
also provided cash contributions set at 5% of
Treasury’s commitment (GM Co. and
Treasury 2009). The GM SPV and Chrysler
SPV received loans of $123 million and $290
million, respectively, from the Treasury on
April 9, 2009. The initial total commitment of
$5 billion ($3.5 billion for GM, $1.5 billion for
Chrysler) was reduced to $3.5 billion ($2.5
billion for GM, $1 billion for Chrysler) on July 8, 2009. The ASSP was terminated on April 5,
2010, for GM and on April 7, 2010, for Chrysler. All loans made under this program were
repaid, and the Treasury collected $116.4 million in fees and interest payments (SIGTARP
2010).
Summary Evaluation
Evaluations of the ASSP were mixed, and its specific role in reducing the pressure on US auto
parts suppliers is difficult to determine. On the outcome of the program, the Treasury stated
that “in part due to the support provided by the Receivables Program, the auto supply base
appears to have been stabilized” (Office of Financial Stability 2010). However, the program
We have not been able to independently confirm the exact number of suppliers that participated or the
amounts used. However, in July 2009 it was reported on Automotive News that 370 direct tier-1 suppliers for
GM and 60 suppliers for Chrysler had participated in the ASSP (Roland 2009). As the ASSP was terminated in
April 2010, the ultimate number may have been different.
3
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was criticized by industry analysts and supplier trade associations as being limited in scope;
furthermore, the third-party servicer, Citibank, was criticized as having issues in loading
purchase orders and generating a lot of confusion among suppliers (MEMA 2009).
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Auto Supplier Support Program: United States Context 2008–2009
GDP
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted
$14,628.0 billion in 2009
to USD)
GDP per capita
$48,383 in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted
$47,100 in 2009
to USD)
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior
S&P: AAA
debt)
As of Q4, 2009:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Size of banking system
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008
$9,789.1 billion in total assets in 2009
Size of banking system as a percentage
68.3% in 2008
of GDP
66.9% in 2009
Size of banking system as a percentage
of financial system
5-bank concentration of banking
system

30.5% in 2008
30.2% in 2009
45% in 2008
44% in 2009

Foreign involvement in banking
system
Government ownership of banking
system

18% in 2008
16% in 2009
0% in 2008
0% in 2009
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2008
Existence of deposit insurance
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2009
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; World Bank, Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey.
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Overview

Background
The Global Financial Crisis that began in 2007 with the decline in the United States subprime
mortgage markets quickly spread beyond the financial sector and eventually reached the US
automotive industry as credit markets tightened. Consequently, the financial crisis
intensified a decades-long decline of two of the largest US auto manufacturers, General
Motors Company (GM) and Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler), leading to a massive
restructuring and bankruptcy for both (Klier and Rubenstein 2012). At the time, GM and
Chrysler’s possible collapse was considered “a potentially crippling blow to the American
economy that the Treasury estimated would eliminate nearly 1.1 million jobs” (COP 2009).
Due to the interdependent nature of the US auto industry, there was a significant risk of
contagion beyond GM and Chrysler to the vast and interconnected network of parts suppliers
that also supported other manufacturers. For example, the Motor and Equipment
Manufacturers Association (MEMA) released data in 2009 showing that 66 percent of
Chrysler suppliers were also suppliers to GM and 54 percent were suppliers to Ford, the
second-largest US auto manufacturer.4 Furthermore, many of the largest auto suppliers such
as Lear, American Axle, and Visteon were in dire financial shape, and hundreds of suppliers
were known to be teetering on the edge (Goolsbee and Kruger 2015). The ongoing crisis
placed unprecedented stress on the US automotive parts suppliers and consequently, the
overall restructuring process of GM and Chrysler that was being overseen by the US
Department of Treasury (Treasury 2009b).5
In normal times, the manufacturer purchased goods and services from suppliers and
promised to pay 45 to 60 days after the shipment (see Figure 1, step 1). In the interim,
suppliers used the receivables from their transactions with the manufacturers as collateral
for supplier bank loans, repaying the loans once the manufacturers paid the receivables (see
Figure 1, step 2) (Klier and Rubenstein 2012). The transactions between manufacturers and
suppliers were typically managed by supply chain servicers, such as Citibank (see Figure 1,
step 3) (SIGTARP 2009a).

While Ford Motor Company also experienced distress during the financial crisis, it was considered to be
significantly more prepared and did not receive support from the Treasury through the Automotive Industry
Financing Program (Klier and Rubenstein 2012).
5 Refer to other YPFS cases on the US Automotive Industry Financing Program for more information at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
4
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Figure 1: Structure of “Business-as-Usual” Operations

Sources: Klier and Rubenstein 2012; SIGTARP 2009a.

However, the crisis threatened this fundamental relationship between manufacturers and
suppliers in three main ways: it tightened receivables payment terms, disrupted
manufacturer operations, and decreased credit for suppliers. First, suppliers tightened
receivables payment terms because of uncertainty surrounding the ability of GM and
Chrysler to pay. The typical payment terms of 45 to 60 days after shipment were shortened
by suppliers, at times requiring cash on delivery, or even advance payment. This negatively
affected the restructuring processes of GM and Chrysler, as it meant the manufacturers
needed to hold significantly more cash on hand (SIGTARP 2009a).
Second, the tightening receivables terms by suppliers disrupted the ability of GM and
Chrysler to produce automobiles on a normal schedule. GM and Chrysler were already
experiencing constricted credit markets and numerous other legacy problems, such as
production overcapacity. This came in addition to their facing massively complex
restructurings and possibly bankruptcy at the time. The manufacturers’ inability to maintain
normal production schedules potentially endangered the suppliers due to their high
concentration in supplying the manufacturers and their very interconnected cycle (SIGTARP
2009a).
Last, banks were less willing to extend credit based on the suppliers’ receivables due to the
uncertainty surrounding GM and Chrysler. Supplier banks/lenders were not certain that the
suppliers would be able to collect the funds owed in the event GM and Chrysler were unable
to honor obligations. Moreover, the general tightening of standards and adverse lender risk
appetite for commercial and industrial loans (see Figure 2) during the crisis, meant suppliers
faced significant difficulties accessing credit (Federal Reserve n.d.1; Federal Reserve n.d.2).
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Figure 2: Supplier Sentiment Index

Source: Bizologie 2011.

Program Description
On March 19, 2009, the Treasury announced a $5 billion commitment ($3.5 billion for GM,
$1.5 billion for Chrysler) to a new Auto Supplier Support Program (ASSP), to “help stabilize
the auto supply base and restore credit flows in a critical sector of the American economy”
(Treasury 2009b; SIGTARP 2010). The ASSP was intended to provide credit for eligible
suppliers and “contemplates the guarantee, or early payment, of qualified automotive
receivables through [a manufacturer’s] establishment of a bankruptcy-remote special
purpose vehicle funded with loans from the US Treasury and capital contributions from the
[manufacturer]” (Chrysler 2009a).
The ASSP was auxiliary to the government’s overall effort to support the US auto industry
under the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) and was authorized under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) (Treasury n.d.).6

6 Refer

to other YPFS cases on the US Automotive Industry Financing Program for more information about the
other elements of support at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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ASSP Structure and Operation
Although aimed at the specific difficulties being experienced by suppliers, the ASSP was
structured to be implemented by, and at the option of, participating manufacturers. This
meant that decisions about which suppliers and which receivables would receive financing
were made by the participating manufacturers (SIGTARP 2009a).
Any domestic auto manufacturer was eligible to participate in the ASSP, although it should
be noted that GM and Chrysler were the only participants (COP 2009). A manufacturer that
chose to participate would first request a funding allocation from the Treasury (Department
of the Treasury 2009a). If accepted, the participating manufacturer was required to establish
the receivables purchase program through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) (namely Chrysler
Receivables SPV, LLC and GM Receivables SPV LLC) that was a bankruptcy-remote, wholly
owned subsidiary of the participating manufacturer (see step 1 in Figure 3) (SIGTARP
2009a).
Figure 3: Structure of Auto Supplier Support Program (ASSP)

Sources: Chrysler and Treasury 2009b; COP 2009; Treasury 2009a; SIGTARP 2009a.

The Treasury’s assistance came in the form of a loan commitment to the SPV at an annual
interest rate equal to the greater of LIBOR or 2 percent, plus 3.5 percent (see Figure 3, step
2). Interest was payable monthly or at the repayment of the loan principal. Unpaid interest
would continue to accrue interest thereon until paid (Chrysler and Treasury 2009b).
The participating manufacturer was required to provide an up-front cash commitment of 5
percent of the Treasury’s total commitment to the SPV prior to, or concurrent with, any
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Treasury loan (SIGTARP 2009a). Based on that requirement, Chrysler injected $50 million
in cash into its SPV and GM injected $125 million (Chrysler 2009a; GM 2009).
The Treasury loans were due, with any accrued interest, on the maturity date, which was set
at one year from the date of closing, although the Treasury could extend this date (Chrysler
and Treasury 2009b).
Funding
On April 3, 2009, Chrysler Receivables SPV, LLC and GM Supplier Receivables LLC, were
formed as bankruptcy-remote, wholly-owned subsidiaries to facilitate the ASSP. To fund the
purchases of receivables and operate the ASSP, the Treasury made loans of $123 million to
the Chrysler SPV and $290 million to the GM SPV on April 9, 2009. The initial total
commitment of $5 billion was reduced to $3.5 billion on July 8, 2009—$2.5 billion for GM
and $1 billion for Chrysler (SIGTARP 2010). By this date, most suppliers had been paid
during the course of the manufacturers’ bankruptcies, and a diminished amount of activity
was expected under the program going forward. See Figure 4 for an overview of funding.
Figure 4: Funding of SPVs

Source: SIGTARP 2010.

New Chrysler
Treasury and Chrysler Receivables SPV, LLC entered into a Credit Agreement dated as of
April 7, 2009, under which the ASSP loan was extended (Chrysler and Treasury 2009b).7
During the bankruptcy process of Chrysler, a Section 363 Transaction of the US Bankruptcy
Code was executed to allow the corporations that would come out of the processes as the
new operating companies—known as New Chrysler—to purchase all equity interests in
their respective SPVs and assume all obligations under the original Credit Agreement.8
Reference is made in the Amended and Restated Credit Agreement to a Security Agreement entered into
seemingly concurrently with the original Credit Agreement, but we have not been able to locate this document.
8 Refer to our other YPFS cases on the US Automotive Industry Financing Program for more information about
the other elements of support at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
7
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Therefore, New Chrysler, Treasury, and Citibank entered into an Amended and Restated
Credit Agreement superseding the original Credit Agreement of April 7, 2009 (Chrysler and
Treasury 2009b).
The parties also entered into a pledge agreement (effective as of the date of the bankruptcy
sale, June 10, 2009, but executed on September 24, 2009) whereby the obligations of
Chrysler SPV obligations to the Treasury and Citibank were secured with a pledge from New
Chrysler (see Figure 3, step 4). In the pledge agreement, Citibank, acting as a collateral agent
and custodian on behalf of itself and Treasury, continued to hold the first priority security
interest in the following property of the manufacturers: (1) all investment property, capital
stock, etc.; (2) all cash, interest, dividends, etc.; (3) all right, title, and interest of the
manufacturer in the receivables, and associated proceeds as part of the pledgor.9 Despite the
pledge to Citibank, Treasury retained ultimate authority with respect to management of the
pledged collateral (Chrysler and Treasury 2009b).
The ASSP was serviced by a third-party servicer, Citibank, which was designated by the
manufacturers. Under the Servicing Agreement between Citibank and Chrysler (also
amended and restated in September 2009), Citibank’s role was to manage, service,
administer, and collect on receivables, and to act as the collateral agent (see Figure 3, step
3). The SPVs were required to pay administrative “Servicer Fees,” which was the product of
the Servicing Fee Rate (1/12 of 0.25 percent) and the average daily aggregate outstanding
principal balance of all receivables held by the SPV each month (Chrysler and Treasury
2009b).
Payment Terms Available to Participating Suppliers
In the operation of the ASSP, suppliers had two options for funding receivables: Payment
Option 1, immediate payment, or Payment Option 2, payment on maturity (see Figure 5). If
the suppliers opted for Payment Option 1, or immediate payment, they could sell the
receivable before a normal payment term to the SPV at a 3 percent (notional value) discount
from face value. The SPV would then seek payment from the manufacturer for the full
amount originally due to the supplier at maturity (SIGTARP 2009a).
If the supplier opted for Payment Option 2, or payment on maturity, the supplier received
the payment, less a 2 percent discount (notional), from the SPV upon maturity of the normal
payment term of 45 to 60 days. If the manufacturer failed to pay the receivable, the SPV
would fund the payment to the supplier. The SPV would then seek payment of the receivable
from the manufacturer (SIGTARP 2009a). The manufacturer was required to remit all
payments in respect of purchased receivables to the collateral account controlled by the
collateral agent, Citibank, on behalf of the SPV (Chrysler and Treasury 2009b).

For a full list of pledged collateral used to secure the SPVs obligations, please refer to the Exhibit N Pledge
Agreement document in the Credit Agreement, under the Implementation Documents. Also see Exhibit I:
Program Terms for a full list of supplier eligibility requirements (Chrysler and Treasury 2009b).
9
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Figure 5: Payment Options

Source: SIGTARP 2009a.

Termination
At the termination of the program (in other words, the Final Distribution Date), all proceeds
available in the collateral account were required to be distributed by the collateral agent,
Citibank, at the direction of the Treasury (see Figure 3, step 6). The distribution of proceeds
in the collateral account was mandated by the Treasury in order of priority, “the Waterfall,”
agreed to by the manufacturers. As part of the Waterfall, the manufacturers were required
to pay an “Exit Fee” and “Contingent Interest.” The Exit Fee was equal to 4 percent of the
amount of the total commitment, and the Contingent Interest was 50 percent of the amount
remaining in the collateral account. As per the Waterfall order, the SPV was the first to take
any losses from the ASSP (GM Co. and Treasury 2009).10
The terms of the credit agreement between the Treasury and the SPVs established by GM
and Chrysler also contained provisions related to compliance and accountability
mechanisms, as was required for all EESA programs utilizing TARP funds. Inspection rights
were given to the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (SIGTARP), Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Treasury (GM Co. and
Treasury 2009). Last, the ASSP was expected to operate for up to one year, with an extension
possible at the Treasury’s direction (SIGTARP 2009a).
Outcomes
Overall, more than 370 tier-1 suppliers (providing direct material) for GM and about 60
suppliers for Chrysler participated in the program (Roland 2009). The Treasury received
back the full principal it had lent, a total of $413 million, as well as $116.4 million in fees and
interest payments, $65.6 million from GM and $50.7 million from Chrysler. The ASSP was
terminated on April 5, 2010, for GM and on April 7, 2010, for Chrysler. All loans made under
this program were repaid with interest and fees (SIGTARP 2010).
A Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) report found that by 2011 the automotive supplier
industry had consolidated considerably (COP 2011).

10 For

more details on the Waterfall, please refer to Section 5, “Collateral Account and Application of Proceeds,”
in the Security Agreement under the Implementation Documents (GM Co. and Treasury 2009).
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Furthermore, the auto supplier industry’s capacity utilization rate, an indicator of the
degree to which an enterprise uses its ability to produce, is currently 60.5 percent.
While this figure is significantly higher than it was at its trough of 45.9 percent during
the crisis, it remains notably lower than the pre-crisis level, when it was typically
above 70 percent. This has led to ongoing consolidation of the supplier industry. Ford,
GM, and Chrysler have announced reductions of 53, 30, and 50 percent, respectively,
in their direct supply bases.
Figure 6: Automotive Supplier Support Program Metrics (in $ millions)
A. Original
commitment

B. Adjusted
commitment

C. Amount
drawn down

GM
Receivables
LLC

$3,500

$2,500

$290.0

$9.1

$56.5

$65.6

Chrysler
Receivables
SPV, LLC

$1,500

$1,000

$123.1

$5.8

$44.5

$50.3

Total

$5,000

$3,500

$413.1

$14.9

$101.1

$115.9

Entity

D. Interest
paid

E. Proceeds
from
additional
notes

F. Total of D
and E

Source: COP 2011.

II.
1.

Key Design Decisions
The ASSP was part of a larger effort by the government to stabilize major auto
manufacturers and restructure the industry.

The Obama administration announced the ASSP in a press release with the goal to “help
stabilize the auto supply base and restore credit flows in a critical sector of the American
economy” to support the overall auto industry. As the auto industry underwent substantial
restructuring, the Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry recognized that a functioning
auto industry relies on viable manufacturers and a network of suppliers (Treasury 2009b).
The Treasury was concerned that supplier instability caused by tightening receivables
conditions, manufacturer disruptions, and decreased credit availability would create greater
uncertainty and “short-circuit restructuring efforts at companies like GM and Chrysler”
(Treasury 2009a).
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The Treasury established the ASSP with authorization from the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 because of the suppliers’ importance to GM
and Chrysler.

The ASSP was established by the Treasury pursuant to the authority granted to it under the
EESA (Chrysler and Treasury 2009b). The Treasury recognized that the manufacturers’
business of producing autos relied on a functioning supplier base. Since the collapse of GM
and Chrysler was perceived by the Treasury to have systemic implications through
contagion risk to the rest of the domestic auto industry, support of their supplier base was
considered crucial (Treasury 2009b).
3.

The government chose to establish the ASSP, despite industry calls for different
types of assistance.

Although Auto Industry Financing Program (AIFP) was the formal program receiving
funding under and authorized by EESA to assist the auto industry using TARP funds, the
program itself served more as a line item that could encompass Treasury’s various loans and
investments in the auto industry within TARP documentation. The AIFP appeared on the
Treasury website weeks after the Bridge Loans.
Prior to the establishment of the ASSP, the Original Equipment Suppliers Association (OESA)
had requested $18.5 billion of support for its supplier members through three forms: (i)
payments for parts shipped in 10 days rather than the standard 45, (ii) a government
guarantee of supplier receivables, and (iii) federally backed bridge loan guarantees (Beene
2009). The ASSP’s $5 billion was not only a fraction of the requested $18.5 billion, but it also
made the manufacturers the arbiters of which suppliers would indirectly receive the benefit
of government assistance; there was no avenue for a supplier to independently choose to
access such assistance if a participating manufacturer, GM or Chrysler, did not designate
them as a participant (SIGTARP 2009a). (See also Key Design Decision No. 8 and Evaluation.)
GM and Chrysler both included support for suppliers in their viability plans (Canis et al.
2009). Rattner (2011) described one such plan as a “far more ambitious” idea for dealing
with the suppliers, “a kind of mini-TARP—a fund to provide so-called debtor-in-possession,
or DIP, financing for suppliers that declared bankruptcy.” However, describing their ultimate
decision, Rattner (2011) said:
Once we drew the line on federal intervention, the supply base was forced to merge,
shrink, and otherwise restructure itself to a size that realistically reflected the industry’s
prospects. And we were faithful to our goal of saving only those jobs for which there was
sound economic justification.
4.

The Treasury made a maximum commitment of $5 billion for the ASSP, which was
soon reduced, as most suppliers were paid during the manufacturers’
bankruptcies.

The initial commitment ceiling of $5 billion ($3.5 billion for GM and $1.5 billion for Chrysler
respectively) was announced on March 19, 2009 (Treasury 2009b). However, on July 8,
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2009, at the request of GM and Chrysler, the original commitments were reduced to $2.5
billion and $1 billion respectively, for a total of $3.5 billion (see Figure 6). Under the original
Credit Agreement between the Treasury and the SPVs, the Treasury commitments could be
decreased if the outstanding amounts did not exceed the commitments made on the
“Commitment Ceiling Reset Date” of June 30, 2009. The original commitments were reduced
because most suppliers had been paid during the course of the manufacturers’ bankruptcies,
and a diminished amount of activity was expected under the program going forward
(SIGTARP 2009b).
5.

The participating manufacturer was required to make a cash contribution to its
ASSP program in addition to the Treasury loan.

To facilitate the ASSP, the SPVs were funded by the Treasury loans and cash contributions
from participating manufacturers (GM Co. and Treasury 2009). The commitment ceiling
refers to the maximum obligation of the Treasury to make loans to the SPV (Chrysler and
Treasury 2009a). Under the terms of the loan agreement, the manufacturers were required
to make a cash contribution to the SPVs as a condition precedent to the obligation of the
Treasury to make good on the loan commitment. The Treasury’s loan agreement outlined
that the aggregate principal loan amount should not exceed the lesser of the commitment
ceiling or an amount equal to the aggregate cash capital contribution made by the
manufacturer to the SPV multiplied by 20 (GM Co. and Treasury 2009). The Treasury loan
had priority over any recovery for the manufacturer. Based on that requirement, Chrysler
injected $50 million in cash into its SPV and GM injected $125 million (Chrysler 2009a; GM
2009).
6.

The program utilized bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicles.

To facilitate the ASSP, SPVs were formed as bankruptcy-remote, wholly owned subsidiaries
of their respective participating manufacturers (SIGTARP 2009a). At the time of the
announcement of the ASSP by the Treasury, GM, and Chrysler had not yet filed for
bankruptcy but there was considerable uncertainty surrounding the viability of the
restructuring process (Treasury 2009b; Office of Public Affairs 2013). Thus, to reassure
suppliers and creditors, the ASSP utilized bankruptcy-remote SPVs. The SPVs were
structured such that, in the event of a bankruptcy filing by the participating manufacturer,
the SPV would be able to continue financing receivables, while the manufacturer continued
to operate under bankruptcy protection (SIGTARP 2009a).
7.

Citibank was appointed as the servicer, paying agent, and collateral manager.

Under the Servicing Agreement, the SPVs appointed Citibank as the servicer. The servicer
handled the daily administrative processing tasks required under the ASSP. Duties included
collecting and posting of all payments; responding to inquiries of suppliers; and monitoring
the collateral account, processed payment instructions, and delivered payment notifications.
They also accounted for collections and furnished monthly statements to the SPVs with
respect to collections and remittances (Chrysler and Treasury 2009b).

270

Journal of Financial Crises

8.

Vol. 4 Iss. 1

The financial obligations of the SPVs to the Treasury and Citibank were secured
by a pledge agreement from their respective manufacturers.

The manufacturers granted to the collateral agent, Citibank, a continuing first priority
security interest in their pledged collateral to secure the SPVs’ financial obligations to the
secured parties (Chrysler and Treasury 2009b).
9.

Although aimed at the specific difficulties being experienced by suppliers, the
ASSP was structured to be implemented by, and at the option of, the
manufacturers.

All domestic manufacturers were eligible to participate in the ASSP, however, only GM and
Chrysler chose to do so (COP 2009). The ASSP was available only to suppliers that were
specifically designated for enrollment by participating manufacturers. This allowed GM and
Chrysler to decide which suppliers were the most important to the overall restructuring
effort and their particular business needs. Some critics claimed that this limited the
program’s scope to the detriment of non-GM and Chrysler suppliers (MEMA 2009). Chrysler
sent a letter to its suppliers saying that the “government loan associated with this program
is not large enough to permit all of Chrysler’s US-based suppliers to participate.” GM noted
that its tier-1 direct suppliers were eligible but its “approximately 16,000 indirect North
American suppliers—who sell to the tier-1 manufacturers or provide GM with
nonmanufacturing services, such as healthcare and information technology—are generally
not eligible” (Canis et al. 2009).
10. Participating suppliers could opt for payment on maturity at a 2 percent charge
or for immediate payment at a 3 percent charge.
Suppliers participating in the ASSP could choose one of two payment options as outlined in
Exhibit F, Supplier Purchase Agreement, in the Credit Agreement (Chrysler and Treasury
2009a). Payment Option 1, or immediate payment, required a discount charge equal to 3
percent (notional) of the receivables face value. This allowed suppliers to access expedited
payments, in the case that immediate liquidity was necessary. Payment Option 2, or payment
on maturity, required a discount charge equal to 2 percent (notional) of the receivables’ face
value (SIGTARP 2009a). See Figure 4.
Despite the original March 19, 2009, Treasury press release indicating that the suppliers
would “pay a small fee” (Treasury 2009b), the fee was specifically designed: to “instill
market discipline, we had made the money so expensive that suppliers thought twice before
signing up” (Rattner 2011). The expensive fee was also cited in Chrysler’s bankruptcy
motion, “other suppliers, moreover, may be unwilling to accept the discount from face value
that accompanies tender of receivables to the Receivables SPV” (Chrysler 2009a).
11. Receivables had significant eligibility requirements.
The eligibility requirements for the receivables were outlined in the Exhibit I, Program
Terms, in the Credit Agreement (Chrysler and Treasury 2009b). To be eligible, the
receivables must have originated after March 19, 2009. All receivables purchased after May
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4, 2009, must have originated not more than 20 days prior to the receivables purchase date
and have a due date at least 30 days after the date of its origination and no later than the
earlier of (a) the date occurring 90 days after the date of its origination and (b) the date two
business days prior to the maturity date. Eligible receivables were required to be the
exclusive property of the supplier, free and clear of all security interests, liens, or claims of
any kind (GM Co. and Treasury 2009).
12. SPVs were required to pay interest on the Treasury loan under the terms of the
Credit Agreement with Treasury.
As stipulated in Section 2.05, Interest Rates and Payment Dates, Article 2, Amount and Terms
of Commitment, of the Credit Agreement, the Treasury’s loan carried an interest rate at a
rate per annum equal to the greater of (a) LIBOR or (b) 2 percent, plus 3.5 percent (Chrysler
and Treasury 2009b).
13. As required by law, Special Notes were issued by the SPVs so the Treasury could
benefit from upside gains.
The Congressional Oversight Panel outlines why these special/additional notes were issued.
They
were financial instruments that Treasury took from the Chrysler and GM SPVs as part of
their agreement to participate in the program; the notes provided Treasury the
opportunity to recognize upside gains on its investments. As dictated in the legislation
that created the TARP, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, financial instruments
such as warrants were to be provided to Treasury in consideration for its investment in
participating institutions. As the law states, instruments such as warrants, or additional
debentures in the case of the ASSP, were created ‘to provide for reasonable participation
by the Secretary, for the benefit of taxpayers, in equity appreciation in the case of a
warrant or other equity security, or a reasonable interest rate premium, in the case of a
debt instrument’ (COP 2011).
14. Oversight of the manufacturers was extended to the suppliers as part of the ASSP.
Inspection rights and access to personnel were given to the Office of the Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Government Accountability Office, and the
Treasury (SIGTARP 2009a; GM Co. and Treasury 2009). It was noted that, “Treasury will also
receive periodic certifications from the suppliers to ensure compliance with the program’s
requirements” (SIGTARP 2009a).
One significant difference between the requirements the manufacturers were under
compared to that for the suppliers was outlined in a SIGTARP report: “Although the auto
manufacturers that participate in ASSP are bound by the EESA executive compensation
limits, Treasury is not requiring the suppliers, even though they are obvious beneficiaries of
the program, to be bound by the same restrictions” (SIGTARP 2009a).
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III. Evaluation
Evaluations of the ASSP have been mixed, and its specific role in reducing the pressure on US
auto parts suppliers is difficult to determine. The Treasury considered the ASSP to be
generally successful while industry participants and supplier associations criticized the
structural complications, control of eligibility by manufacturers, and high compliance costs
of the program.
On the outcome of the program, the Treasury has stated that “in part due to the support
provided by the Receivables Program, the auto supply base appears to have been stabilized.
Suppliers are now breaking even at a lower level of North American productions” (Office of
Financial Stability 2010). Steve Rattner, Counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury at the
time, commented on the reduction of the initial $5 billion to $3.5 billion: “given the general
success of the [ASSP], a much lower amount was needed to stabilize the supplier base”
(Rattner 2011).
The Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA), testifying before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Economic Policy Subcommittee in 2009,
noted that the ASSP “did help prevent widespread loan covenant violations and demands for
changes in customer payment terms” and that “without a doubt, the US Treasury Auto
Supplier Support Program helped avert a potential implosion of the supply base” (MEMA
2009).
However, MEMA also roundly criticized the ASSP. First, MEMA stated in their Senate
testimony that beyond the direct suppliers to GM and Chrysler, the broader supplier base
“found themselves without access to the program.” This included “small suppliers, suppliers
manufacturing in the US, and shipping to Canada and Mexico and suppliers directly providing
replacement and warranty parts and tooling” (MEMA 2009). In contrast, as mentioned in
Key Design Decision No. 10, Rattner (2011) insists that the restrictively high fee was
designed to “instill market discipline, we had made the money so expensive that suppliers
thought twice before signing up.” Rattner’s idea was that the limited size of the program
helped ensure that, despite the inevitable downsizing of the industry, GM and Chrysler’s
needs were met.
Second, a survey by the Original Equipment Suppliers Association (OESA) indicated that
while “half of the direct suppliers to GM and/or Chrysler were eligible to participate, only
half of those eligible suppliers were actually able to take part in the program.” The MEMA
testified that this was due to technical issues in loading the thousands of purchase orders
into Citibank’s system (MEMA 2009). At the time, Citibank was the third-party servicer
providing a software system called Citi Supplier Finance to administer the ASSP (Chrysler
and Treasury 2009b).
Industry analysts and media reports also had different views on the success of the program.
Participation in the ASSP was considered to be relatively limited, according to media reports,
which stated that GM had aided slightly more than 370 tier-1 direct material suppliers and
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Chrysler about 60.11 This was about a quarter of the approximately 1,800 tier-1 suppliers to
GM and Chrysler according to figures from the OESA. The disclosures of participation
numbers prompted criticism of the program by US auto industry analysts, who deemed it
“inadequate” (Roland 2009). Another report stated that the $5 billion in support had been a
fraction of the $18.5 billion formally requested by the OESA. The original $18.5 billion
request included: (i) payments for parts shipped in 10 days rather than the standard 45, (ii)
a government guarantee of supplier receivables, and (iii) federally backed bridge loan
guarantees (Beene 2009).
Criticism was also aimed at the fees and compliance costs associated with participation in
the program. Stephen Gross, a lawyer who represented about 30 suppliers, stated that fees
amounted to “hundreds of thousands of dollars apiece for some suppliers” (Roland 2009).
The 2 percent discount for 60 day receivables protected under the ASSP added up to a 12
percent annualized rate, which was considered to be expensive. The high cost in terms of
compliance was also noted. Joe Bione, a workout specialist and president of the Whitehall
Group, a management and consulting company based in in Troy, Michigan, and specializing
in suppliers, stated “the paperwork was unbelievable.” Last, Citibank, the third-party
servicer, was criticized as being “slow to gear up and generating a lot of confusion” by Walter
Borda, a partner with Borda, Lorenz & Geggie in Novi, Michigan, a corporate and business
planning law firm that had ASSP participants as clients (Sherefkin 2010).
According to Neil De Koker, president of the OESA, it is also important to note that less than
100 Chrysler suppliers were processed, partly because the manufacturer went through the
bankruptcy process so quickly. Furthermore, a number of suppliers to GM and Chrysler were
considered “critical vendors” and consequently fully paid during the bankruptcy, which may
have also impacted participation numbers (Sherefkin 2010). As defined in Chrysler’s debtorin-possession (DIP) loan agreement with the Treasury, critical vendor payments were made
to ensure that troubled vendors that were critical to the production plan were operating to
supply parts to the manufacturer going through bankruptcy (Chrysler 2009b).
Other concerns related to the ASSP include a SIGTARP report (2009a) which highlighted:
vulnerability borne from the structure of the [ASSP], which empowered the automobile
manufacturers with unfettered discretion to choose which suppliers and at what
amounts the suppliers can participate in the program—effectively picking winners and
losers with no clear restrictions.

YPFS has not been able to independently confirm the exact number of suppliers that participated or the
amounts used. However, in July 2009 it was reported on Automotive News that 370 direct tier-1 suppliers for
GM and 60 suppliers for Chrysler had participated in the ASSP. As the ASSP was terminated in April 2010, the
real number may have been different from the 430 total.
11
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